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Abstract 
The Global Financial Crisis generated renewed interest in the relevance of John Maynard 
Keynes’s economic policy proposals, particularly those related to budget deficits, public 
debt and government expenditure. ‘Keynesian’ economic policies are commonly understood 
as entailing short-run fiscal activism, by which is meant discretionary, counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy together with deliberate budget deficits. However, this was not Keynes’s actual 
position. In the General Theory Keynes contended that demand-deficiency was a permanent 
problem in a modern capitalist economy. Seen in this light, Keynes’s central policy concern 
was with maintaining full employment through a permanent enlargement of the public 
sector and associated public expenditures. Keynes also held a rather conservative view 
towards public debt and was opposed to debt-financed current expenditure. This thesis 
reappraises Keynes’s policy views by reference to the relevant primary and secondary 
materials. Particular attention is given to Keynes’s much neglected policy writings 
contained in the 1942-45 Treasury Memoranda. The core logic of Keynes’s policy position 
is then captured in an illustrative model of a demand-led economy. Keynes’s central policy 
objectives are represented by requiring that the growth in public expenditure is sufficient to 
maintain full employment, but subject to a debt sustainability constraint. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The recessionary conditions caused by the Global Financial Crisis led to a revival of interest 
in John Maynard Keynes and Keynesian economics more generally. The simultaneous 
downturn in economic activity throughout developed countries in late 2008 and 2009 saw 
sharp contractions in output, rising cyclical unemployment and a deterioration in public 
finances. Seen in this light, the global downturn has called into question the capacity of a 
decentralised competitive economy to automatically self-correct and eliminate 
unemployment in the absence of government intervention.  
In this context there has been a resurgence of interest in the possible relevance of Keynes’s 
theory and policy. The fiscal and monetary responses of governments in developed 
countries to falling private demand were popularly described as having a ‘Keynesian’ 
character.2 Governments implemented discretionary fiscal stimulus spending in order to 
offset sharp contractions in household consumption and private investment. Activist fiscal 
policy was supported by the responses of central banks in implementing expansionary 
monetary policy. The operation of budgetary automatic stabilisers together with the effect of 
discretionary fiscal measures saw increasing budget deficits and rising public debt 
trajectories. Net public debt increased in the United States from 42.0 percent to 72.6 percent 
of GDP between 2006 and 2011, and in the United Kingdom from 38.0 percent to 72.9 
percent of GDP over the same period (IMF, 2011). The question of public debt 
sustainability continues to be a significant contemporary economic and political issue.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See for instance, Fox (2008), Reddy (2009), Melloan (2009), Carling (2009), Skidelsky (2010a), Irvine 
(2011). 
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At the level of popular influence, there is a well-established belief that Keynes advocated 
short-run fiscal activism in response to an economic downturn. Keynes is commonly 
understood to have called for the ‘fine-tuning’ of government expenditure through 
temporary fiscal stimulus, together with public works programs. With a view to expanding 
the economy through public borrowing this would amount to the deliberate creation of 
government budget deficits. Indeed, Keynes is sometimes charged with being the ‘apostle of 
permanent budget deficits’ (Skidelsky, 2010b: xviii). Discretionary, ‘counter-cyclical’ and 
debt-financed fiscal policy has become the mainstay of the conventional characterisation of 
Keynes’s economic policies. However, this was not Keynes’s actual policy position. 
It is well documented that Keynesian economic policies were not the economic policies of 
Keynes.3 Motivated by the recent renewed interest in Keynes, this thesis seeks to reappraise 
his economic policy proposals with respect to the issues of public debt, budget deficits and 
government expenditure.4 The relevant primary materials to be examined are the General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Keynes, 1936; hereafter the ‘General Theory’ 
or ‘GT’) together with Keynes’s policy writings from the 1940s while working at the British 
Treasury. These policy documents arose from Keynes’s involvement in post-war planning 
and are referred to as the 1942-45 Treasury Memoranda (reproduced in Volume 27 of The 
Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Moggridge, 1980: 203-419; hereafter 
‘CW27’). The primary material is supported by a relatively coherent body of secondary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See for instance, Meltzer (1981), Kregel (1985; 1993; 1994-95), Pressman (1987), Guger and Walterskirchen 
(1988), Smithin (1989), Seccareccia (1994; 1995), Brown-Collier and Collier (1995), Bateman (2005), 
Backhouse and Bateman (2008) and Aspromourgos (2011). 
4 This thesis leaves aside Keynes’s policy proposals for international monetary and exchange-rate 
arrangements in the post-war world. 
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literature that has highlighted the dissonance between the long-term policy views held by 
Keynes himself and what later came to be regarded as Keynesian policy.  
Keynes’s core policy position was much more far-reaching than temporary, debt-financed 
fiscal activism during a recession. Keynes called for a permanent enlargement of the public 
sector (supported by a scheme of low real interest rates), which would prevent economic 
fluctuations and maintain full employment. This normative prescription was grounded on 
Keynes’s theory, which led him to assert that aggregate demand deficiency was a persistent 
problem in a decentralised, competitive economy. Keynes saw a difference between policies 
designed to maintain full employment by avoiding economic fluctuations (described in this 
thesis as anti-cyclical policies) and those of a conventional counter-cyclical character.5 In 
the context of Britain in the 1930s and 1940s Keynes’s preferred vehicle for the 
enlargement of government expenditure was public investment spending to be undertaken 
by decentralised public entities – the so-called ‘socialisation’ of investment (GT: 378). In 
contrast to common understanding, Keynes did not advocate the kind of consumption 
manipulation or counter-cyclical fiscal policy often regarded as characteristically 
‘Keynesian’. 
Further, Keynes did not support the deliberate creation of government budget deficits. To 
this effect, Keynes appears to have been somewhat more conservative towards the issue of 
public debt than is commonly understood. This is reflected in his proposal for a formal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This thesis makes a theoretical distinction between counter-cyclical and anti-cyclical policies. The Oxford 
Dictionary of English defines ‘counter-’ as ‘retaliation’ or ‘movement or effect in the opposite direction’. 
‘Anti-’ is defined as ‘against’ or ‘preventing’. While a counter-cyclical policy responds to a change in private 
demand, an anti-cyclical policy seeks to prevent it from occurring. Keynes separates the tasks of preventing 
and reacting to demand fluctuations. However, to the extent that both policies in practice would be conducted 
in a forward-looking manner the distinction is only to highlight that Keynes’s focus was on preventing 
fluctuations. 
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distinction between the government’s current and capital budgetary items. Keynes opposed 
discretionary budget deficits of current expenditures over current revenue. However, 
Keynes did maintain that public capital expenditures should be at least partly debt-financed. 
As such, Keynes’s concern was with the accumulation of public debt issued to finance 
current expenditure, or so-called ‘dead-weight debt’ (CW27: 278). In Keynes’s first-best 
world, changes in public expenditure would ensure that full-employment output was 
maintained so that the current budget would remain balanced or in surplus. Having recourse 
to debt-financed current spending during a recession was only really a second-best 
expedient for Keynes. 
Re-examining the character of Keynes’s policy position has general relevance to the recent 
fiscal policies adopted in developed countries. After initially being confronted with the 
short-term task of expanding public expenditures, the concern of policy-makers soon shifted 
towards the alleged longer-term challenges relating to public debt sustainability and fiscal 
restraint. It is not argued that Keynes’s specific policy proposals formed in the context of 
1940s Britain should be directly applied in the current context. However, the revival of 
interest in Keynesian economics does warrant a re-appraisal of the character of the 
economic policies that Keynes, the economist, is understood to have supported. 
This thesis is organised into five chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
secondary literature that has interpreted Keynes’s policy views. It examines the common 
understanding of Keynesian economic policies before evaluating the alternative 
interpretations that have reconstructed Keynes’s policy position based on the General 
Theory together with the Treasury Memoranda. This literature reveals the nature of 
Keynes’s proposals for public expenditure, while also showing his apparently conservative 
views towards deficit-financed spending. The literature also emphasises the importance of 
 9. 
	  
the ‘socialisation’ of investment to Keynes’s post-war policy proposals, although this is 
somewhat overstated.  
Chapter 3 analyses the relevant primary materials. While some understanding of Keynes’s 
long-term policy proposals can be discerned from examining Keynes’s speculative ‘Social 
Philosophy’ in the General Theory itself, these ideas are clarified by giving a detailed 
discussion of the 1942-45 wartime Treasury Memoranda. These writings have been much 
neglected in contemporary discussions of Keynes’s views on economic policy. They show 
that Keynes’s policy position was much more far-reaching than short-run fiscal activism.  
Chapter 4 develops an illustrative model to capture the core logic of Keynes’s policy 
objectives. In a demand-led theoretical setting, this is represented as requiring that the 
growth in public expenditure is sufficient to maintain full employment, but where the 
government budget is subject to a debt sustainability constraint. A Domar (1944) type 
condition requires the stabilisation of the public debt-to-GDP ratio at a definite long-period 
value, which entails a sustainable primary public deficit-to-GDP ratio. The mathematical 
derivations relevant to Chapter 4 are provided in an Appendix. A necessary condition for a 
debt-constrained full employment policy to be economically feasible is that the sum of the 
total budget deficit and private investment, expressed as shares of total income, is positive 
and less than the ratio of private savings to after-tax income. With the other parameters 
given, the government’s choice of an income tax rate along with an interest rate determines 
the long-period public debt-to-GDP ratio in the economy. The model also provides a 
theoretical basis for a ‘cheap money’ policy. Chapter 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
This thesis provides a more rigorous analytical treatment of the primary and secondary 
literature concerning Keynes’s economic policy position. Part of the contribution of this 
thesis to the literature is to clarify the nature of Keynes’s preference for public investment 
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spending over consumption to the extent that it was somewhat contingent on Keynes’s 
historical and political context, including his views on ‘capital saturation’. In addition, this 
thesis extends on the existing literature by developing an illustrative model that captures the 
central logic of Keynes’s policy position. In particular, it provides a framework for 
analysing public debt sustainability within Keynes’s theory. While it is not the purpose of 
this thesis to ask whether Keynes would or would not have approved of the stance of recent 
fiscal policies, this thesis will clarify the character of policies that Keynes envisaged as 
being desirable for maintaining full employment in a liberal capitalist economy.  
 11. 
	  
Chapter 2. Literature review: Keynes and economic policy  
Naturally enough, Keynes’s economics and policy have generated numerous different 
interpretations. It is certainly conceivable that an intellectual and ideological vision so rich 
as Keynes’s should evolve into something beyond the conception of Keynes himself. In this 
respect, the conventional characterisation of ‘Keynesian’ economic policy has broken many 
of the links with Keynes’s work itself. This chapter critically examines the secondary 
literature that has interpreted Keynes’s policy proposals, in turn highlighting the dissonance 
between Keynes’s own policy ideas and those that have subsequently been attributed to him. 
There are important differences between Keynesian economic policy and the economic 
policies of Keynes. This thesis follows the approach of Leijonhufvud (1967) by using the 
epithet ‘Keynesian’ to describe the majority school of macroeconomics that developed from 
Keynes’s General Theory. This is a narrower characterisation than the so-called 
‘Keynesian’ political philosophy embracing a mixed-market economy and the welfare state 
that dominated most Western economies in the three decades following World War II (cf. 
Backhouse and Bateman, 2008).  
The common and widely held characterisation of Keynesian economic policy is that it 
amounts to short-run fiscal activism. By this is meant discretionary, counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy, typically by way of recourse to deficit spending. However, this was not Keynes’s 
position. The simplified caricature of Keynes’s policy views has been described in the 
literature using such expressions as ‘Bastard Keynesianism’, ‘Hydraulic Keynesianism’ and 
‘fiscalism’.6 The secondary question of how Keynes came to be associated with policies that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For instance, Guger and Walterskirchen (1988: 107), Wray (1994: 285-86) and Seccareccia (1995: 43) 
borrow Joan Robinson’s expression ‘Bastard Keynesianism’ to describe the policy views that were espoused 
by Keynes’s ‘disciples’ such as John Hicks, Alvin Hansen, Abba Lerner, and especially Paul Samuelson. 
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he never actually endorsed is left aside. However, one may conjecture that at least part of 
the answer rests with the influence of the second-generation Keynesians such as Hicks, 
Hansen, Lerner and Samuelson (cf. Brazelton, 1980-81; Pearce and Hoover, 1995; 
Backhouse and Bateman, 2008). 
By contrast, since the early 1980s a body of secondary literature has reconstructed Keynes’s 
policy position from his writings contained in the 1942-45 Treasury Memoranda, together 
with the General Theory. There is broad agreement across the literature that Keynes 
supported a full employment policy that called for a permanent expansion in government 
expenditure, with an emphasis on public investment, to prevent macroeconomic 
fluctuations. At the same time, Keynes was opposed to budget deficits, except so far as 
capital expenditures were concerned, and somewhat cautious regarding the issue of public 
debt. 
Chapter 2 consists of three sections. Section 2.1 discusses Keynes’s approach towards 
theory and policy. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the conventional or popular view of 
so-called ‘Keynesian’ policy. Finally, Section 2.3 critically examines the secondary 
literature that has reappraised Keynes’s policy position in light of the Treasury Memoranda.  
2.1 Keynes on theory and policy 
For Keynes, the application of theoretical principles to practical policy issues was a 
secondary question to developing a descriptive theory of a modern capitalist economy. The 
General Theory itself is primarily concerned with theoretical problems. Keynes notes in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Coddington (1976: 1263-65) uses the epithet ‘Hydraulic Keynesians’ to refer to the exponents of ‘Keynesian 
economics’ in the 1940s and 1950s that invoked the IS-LM model. He also distinguishes between 
Keynesianism as a normative policy doctrine (popularly interpreted as ‘fiscalism’), and Keynesianism as a 
descriptive theory of the economy. 
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preface that ‘its main purpose is to deal with difficult questions of theory, and only in the 
second place with the applications of this theory to practice’ (GT: xv). However, Keynes 
believed that it was the role of the economist not only to construct theoretical models but 
also to develop policy recommendations (Patinkin, 1984: 99). Defending the General 
Theory in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Keynes (1937) wrote: 
This that I offer is, therefore, a theory of why output and employment are so liable to 
fluctuation. It does not offer a ready-made remedy as to how to avoid these 
fluctuations and to maintain output at a steady optimum level. But it is, properly 
speaking, a Theory of Employment because it explains why, in any given 
circumstances, employment is what it is. Naturally I am interested not only in the 
diagnosis, but also in the cure; and many pages of my book are devoted to the latter. 
But I consider that my suggestions for a cure, which, avowedly, are not worked out 
completely, are on a different plane from the diagnosis. They are not meant to be 
definitive; they are subject to all sorts of special assumptions and are necessarily 
related to the particular conditions of the time. But my main reasons for departing 
from the traditional theory go much deeper than this. They are of a highly general 
character and are meant to be definitive. (Keynes, 1937: 221-22, emphasis added) 
Interestingly, economic policies of a conventional Keynesian character had already been 
proposed throughout Europe and the United States well before Keynes’s theoretical 
innovations (cf. Hutchison, 1953; Patinkin 1983a; Musgrave, 1987; Kregel, 1993; 1994-95; 
Backhouse and Bateman, 2008). Hall (1989) described this as ‘proto-Keynesianism’. In 
particular, Hutchison (1953: 422) argued that by 1929 the majority of economists in Britain 
 14. 
	  
(including Keynes) supported the general case for public works to reduce unemployment.7 
This support was in opposition to the orthodox ‘Treasury View’ that public works would 
crowd-out private sector expenditure (cf. Keynes, 1929; Hutchison, 1953: 414-23; Bidel, 
2008). To the extent that activist fiscal policy was already a mainstream proposition, Pearce 
and Hoover (1995: 186) have suggested that the ‘underlying motivation [of the General 
Theory] was to bring intellectual coherence to a family of anti-depression policies that had 
already been widely supported on pragmatic grounds’.  
There are however a small number of direct policy recommendations in the General Theory. 
Keynes makes several references to the employment-expanding effect of public works via 
the multiplier (GT: 116-17, 119-20, 127-31). He also provides several discussions of the 
limitations of monetary policy as a short-run policy for managing private investment (GT: 
163-64, 202-08, 315-21, 378). Further, in Chapter 19 Keynes refutes the argument that 
downward-flexible money-wages would ensure the restoration of full employment, leading 
him to support a rigid money-wage policy (GT: 257-71). 
The clearest direct exposition of Keynes’s policy position in the General Theory is in 
Chapter 24, ‘Concluding Notes on the Social Philosophy Towards which the General 
Theory Might Lead’ (GT: 372-84). In this chapter, Keynes envisages the policy framework 
that would be desirable for the maintenance of full employment in a liberal capitalist 
society. However, this vision is not a necessary consequence of the preceding theoretical 
parts, and much of it is contingent on the historical and political context. In a letter to E. F. 
M. Durbin (later a Labour MP) in 1936, Keynes acknowledged that Chapter 24 brought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Keynes rested his advocacy of public works on the multiplier mechanism; cf. The Means to Prosperity 
(Keynes, 1933). 
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together all kinds of non-economic factors ‘about which economists as such are entitled, as 
well as likely, to differ…amongst themselves’ (Moggridge, 1979: 231). 
2.2 The conventional characterisation of Keynes’s policy position 
Keynesian economic policies, broadly conceived, call for demand management through 
short-run fiscal activism. This normative proposition is grounded on the central theoretical 
innovation of the General Theory: the possibility of systematic demand deficiency in a 
capitalist economy. Coddington (1976: 1264) argued that at the level of popular influence 
‘Keynesianism is a doctrine about how a largely decentralized economy may be subject to 
broad (as opposed to detailed) central control or influence through the instrument of the 
budget’. In this respect the conventional characterisation of Keynesian economic policy has 
three main themes. These are an advocacy of discretionary, counter-cyclical fiscal policy; 
the deliberate creation of budget deficits; and a belief that government expenditure does not 
crowd-out private spending. 
Firstly, central to the common understanding of Keynesian policies is a counter-cyclical role 
for fiscal policy that reacts to, and compensates for, cyclical changes in private demand. 
Modigliani (1977: 1) described the impetus for demand stabilisation as the ‘fundamental 
practical message’ of Keynesian economics. Granted that the economy may be absent of 
any reliable forces that re-establish full employment, and given a positive relation between 
government expenditures and national income, there is a role for temporary fiscal fine-
tuning of aggregate spending over the business cycle (cf. Kregel, 1994-95: 261; Seccareccia, 
1995: 43-44). To this extent, Keynesian policy adjustments are generally considered to be 
discretionary rather than rules-based.  
 16. 
	  
Secondly, at the level of popular influence Keynesian policy advocates a role for budget 
deficits financed by public borrowing. In the event of a recession Keynesian policy calls for 
the expansion of aggregate spending through debt-financed government expenditure 
(Musgrave, 1987: 172). Keynes’s alleged advocacy of counter-cyclical fiscal activism has 
commonly been conceived of as support for unqualified deficit spending (Kregel, 1994-95: 
267). For instance Dalton (1954: 221) in the fourth edition of Principles of Public Finance, 
claimed that ‘the new approach to budgetary policy’ meant that ‘[w]e may now free 
ourselves from the old and narrow conception of balancing the budget, no matter over what 
period, and move towards a new and wider conception of balancing the whole economy’. 
The association of Keynes with increasing budget deficits has led to the charge of fiscal 
profligacy. In a seminal rebuke of Keynesian political economy, Buchanan and Wagner 
(1977: 24) noted that the ‘legacy or heritage of Lord Keynes is the putative intellectual 
legitimacy provided to the natural and predictable political biases towards deficit spending, 
inflation, and the growth of government’. They argued that the Keynesian revolution 
overturned the ‘traditional and time-honoured norms for fiscal responsibility’ and 
legitimised the deliberate creation of budget deficits on the principle that the ‘[b]udget 
balance did not matter’ (1977: 30-31; cf. Bateman, 2005). 
Thirdly, the efficacy of Keynesian demand management policies relies on the absence of 
any substantial decline in private spending in response to an increase in government 
expenditure. Blanchard (2008) used the expression ‘crowding out’ to refer to the various 
channels through which expansionary fiscal policy may not have a positive effect on output. 
One of these channels is the Ricardian equivalence theorem (attributed to Barro, 1974), 
which contends that a debt-financed financed tax cut must be matched by future tax 
increases, leaving the present value of future taxes unchanged and therefore consumption 
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spending unchanged (cf. Blanchard, 2008; Cunningham and Vilasuso, 1994: 190). A second 
channel is the ‘real’ crowding out effect, which supposes that an increase in public spending 
at full employment is offset by a diversion of resources away from the private sector. A 
third channel is the ‘financial’ crowding out effect, which claims that a higher budget deficit 
stimulates output, but is (partially or fully) offset by an increase in the rate of interest that 
causes a decline in interest-elastic private investment (Blanchard, 2008). 
The conventional characterisation of Keynesian economic policy amounts to short-run fiscal 
activism. The next section provides a survey of the alternative interpretations of Keynes’s 
economic policy position. This will emphasise the contrast between Keynes’s policy 
proposals and those commonly considered to be Keynesian. Section 2.3 also begins to 
clarify the central concerns of Keynes’s policy position, which are represented in the 
illustrative model in Chapter 4. 
2.3 Alternative interpretations of Keynes’s policy position 
This section examines the development of the small body of secondary literature since the 
early 1980s that has reappraised Keynes’s long-term policy position in light of the 1942-45 
Treasury Memoranda. There is a significant degree of continuity across the literature 
relating to Keynes’s core views on government expenditures and public finances. Keynes is 
understood to have supported a full employment policy that would prevent business cycle 
fluctuations (in this sense, an anti-cyclical policy) through a long-term public investment 
program. While the government’s current budget should not be in deficit, public investment 
expenditure was to be partly debt-financed and partly of a ‘user-pays’ character. To the 
extent that his preference for public investment was of a somewhat contingent nature, 
Keynes’s more general proposal was for a permanent enlargement of the public sector.  
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Meltzer (1981) provided the first significant reinterpretation of Keynes’s policy position 
making detailed reference to the Treasury Memoranda. Meltzer (1981: 43) argued that 
Keynes’s central policy concern was with eliminating involuntary unemployment through 
the stabilisation of investment. In turn, Meltzer refuted the notion that Keynes advocated 
counter-cyclical budgetary policy and short-run fiscal stimulus. According to Meltzer (1981: 
34-36), the General Theory was Keynes’s attempt to explain why government intervention 
could move an economy closer to full employment by systematically increasing the capital 
stock and output. 
Meltzer contended that rather than advocating short-run fiscal activism, Keynes believed 
that output could be increased by raising and stabilising the average level of investment and 
reducing interest rate risk premiums. This proposition was grounded on the two key themes 
of Keynes’s theory (Meltzer, 1981: 43, 57-61). Firstly, output fluctuations were primarily 
caused by changes in unpredictable, long-term expectations. Secondly, fluctuations in 
output and employment occurred around a level below that which might otherwise have 
been attainable with a higher level of total investment. 
According to Meltzer (1981: 43, 61), Keynes proposed several policies to raise total 
investment, including: lowering the long-term rate of interest through a monetary or wage 
policy; eliminating the influence of speculation and the volatility of expectations; and 
redistributing income in order to increase the economy’s propensity to consume. However, 
Meltzer claimed that Keynes’s core solution was the state management of investment – the 
so-called ‘socialisation’ of investment.8 Public investment spending would dampen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Meltzer distinguished between Keynes’s public investment program and Keynes’s public works proposals, 
treating the latter as a policy aimed at increasing current period consumption. Patinkin (1983b: 49) argued that 
this distinction was artificial, and that Keynes regarded the two as being interchangeable. Meltzer (1983: 71-
73) reinforced his interpretation in a subsequent response. 
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fluctuations in total demand and reduce the cyclical component of involuntary 
unemployment. A long-term program of state investment expenditure could bring 
investment to its ‘saturation point’ where the equilibrium marginal efficiency of capital was 
reduced to zero (Meltzer, 1981: 46). 
Meltzer (1981: 41) contended that there is little evidence to suggest that Keynes supported 
‘compensatory’ (that is, counter-cyclical) fiscal policy or the fine-tuning of government 
spending in response to macroeconomic fluctuations. In fact, Keynes actually opposed 
measures to influence consumer spending through unplanned changes in government 
expenditure and taxation.9 Meltzer observed that this is consistent with Keynes’s emphasis 
on the role of expectations, which led him to conclude that the most practicable way to 
reduce fluctuations in income was to prevent fluctuations in investment. Meltzer (1981: 62) 
argued that ‘Keynes’s main concern in the General Theory and after is to reduce the 
instability of the economy by eliminating fluctuations in the most volatile elements, not to 
substitute one source of variability for another’. Meltzer (1981: 47) also observed that 
Keynes was opposed to a counter-cyclical role for monetary policy. 
Meltzer’s interpretation of Keynes’s policy position differs markedly from the conventional 
characterisation of Keynesian fiscal activism. In this regard, Meltzer (1981: 41) also noted 
that there is some documented evidence suggesting that Keynes did not accept the post-war 
economic policies conventionally termed ‘Keynesian’ and even described himself as ‘not a 
Keynesian’. However, there is some doubt as to the factual reliability of these statements 
(cf. Patinkin, 1983b: 49-50). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Keynes’s only exception to this is James Meade’s social security proposal (Meltzer, 1981: 42). See Section 
3.2. 
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Kregel (1985; 1993; 1994-95) is another important figure in the reappraisal of Keynes’s 
long-term policy position. Like Meltzer, Kregel (1985: 33) argued that the stabilisation of 
investment was Keynes’s primary long-term policy goal. Kregel’s key contributions were in 
examining Keynes’s apparent aversion to budget deficits, as well as the preventative or 
‘defensive’ character of Keynes’s policy views. 
Kregel (1985: 35) contended that deliberate government budget deficits were not part of 
Keynes’s full employment policy. In fact, Keynes’s long-term policy proposals were 
designed to ensure that budget deficits of current expenditure and revenue were prevented 
from occurring in the first place. According to Kregel, Keynes advocated the formal 
separation of capital and current items in the government budget into distinct ‘capital’ and 
‘ordinary’ (or current) budget accounts, respectively. Public investment expenditures would 
be shown on the capital budget and were to be financed by public borrowing and user-
charges. However, Kregel (1985: 35) noted that Keynes drew a sharp distinction between 
debt-financed capital spending and current expenditure. If full employment was maintained 
the ordinary budget should remain balanced over the long-term and as such, public debt 
should eventually decline as a proportion of national income. Seen in this light, Keynes 
viewed budget deficits as a consequence of the failure of policy-makers to achieve full 
employment rather than as a desirable recourse to remedy unemployment during a recession 
(Kregel, 1985: 32). In this regard Keynes acknowledged that there was a significant role for 
cyclical influences on the ordinary budget balance.  
Kregel (1985: 33-34, 37-38) also emphasised Keynes’s preference for a preventative (that 
is, anti-cyclical) fiscal policy program, rather than one that reacted to fluctuations in private 
demand (that is, counter-cyclical). According to Kregel, Keynes’s public investment 
expenditures were to be delivered through ‘public and semi-public bodies’ so as to produce 
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the long-term level of investment associated with full employment. In two subsequent 
articles, Kregel (1993; 1994-95) further explored Keynes’s emphasis on preventative policy 
action. He distinguished between Keynes’s so-called ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ economic 
policy. ‘Offensive’ policy was to be applied in depressed conditions, while ‘defensive’ 
policy was to perform an ongoing, long-term role as a preventative defence against 
recessions before they occurred.10 Kregel (1993: 429) contended that Keynes’s ‘defensive’ 
policy called for the socialisation of investment implemented by means of a capital budget. 
Keynes’s preference for public investment spending over fiscal manipulation of 
consumption is another important theme in Kregel (1985). Keynes is sceptical of the 
efficacy of measures to stimulate short-run consumption spending through the current 
budget. On the composition of government expenditure, Smithin (1989: 210) argued that 
Keynes supported a larger direct contribution by the state to fixed capital formation, 
together with a broader set of initiatives by which public and quasi-public authorities would 
be able to influence a substantial proportion of total investment spending. Smithin argued 
that Keynes did not advocate the sort of ‘fiscal fine-tuning’ later termed ‘Keynesian’. He 
also observed that Keynes’s preference for state investment over consumption spending 
would be less susceptible to any ‘crowding out’ effect, and could in actual fact ‘crowd in’ 
private investment (Smithin, 1989: 214-15, 219-20). Similarly, Pressman (1987: 17) noted 
that public investment would have the economic advantages over current government 
expenditures of raising productivity and having a greater impact on employment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Kregel claimed that Keynes’s ‘offensive’ policy influenced ‘short-period inter-temporal prices’ with the goal 
of reversing market expectations of further price reductions during a recession. This drew heavily on Keynes’s 
earlier theoretical work still steeped in orthodoxy, A Treatise on Money (1930). 
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Moreover, Kregel (1985: 32; 1994-95: 261) suggested that many of the policy 
recommendations commonly attributed to Keynes – particularly the support for counter-
cyclical fiscal policy and deliberate budget deficits – more closely resemble Abba Lerner’s 
theory of ‘functional finance’.11 Pearce and Hoover (1995: 189) argued that by the late 
1940s, while the economics profession had settled on the IS-LM model as the Keynesian 
theoretical model, Lerner’s analysis constituted the standard textbook exposition of 
mainstream Keynesian policy (cf. Colander, 1984). However, it is unclear whether 
‘functional finance’ meaningfully informed Keynes’s own views on economic policy and 
Keynes’s attitude towards Lerner’s theory is subject to historical debate (cf. Colander, 1984; 
Scitovsky, 1984; Pérez Caldentey, 2003).  
More recently, Brown-Collier and Collier (1995) re-emphasised Keynes’s core policy views 
in light of the Treasury Memoranda together with the body of secondary literature that had 
developed. Brown-Collier and Collier reiterated the central theme in the literature that 
Keynes’s long-term policy for promoting full employment and reducing economic 
fluctuations was the socialisation of investment. Contrary to the conventional 
characterisation of Keynesian policies, Keynes did not call for recurring budget deficits to 
finance current expenditure, nor did he advocate counter-cyclical policy to smooth 
fluctuations in income and consumption. In an extension on the previous literature, Brown-
Collier and Collier (1995: 345-50) also provided a more comprehensive discussion of how 
different government expenditure, revenue and financial transactions would be recorded on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 ‘Functional finance’ posited that fiscal measures should be judged solely by their effectiveness rather than 
upon the basis of what was ‘sound’ or ‘unsound’ in terms of balancing the budget. The ‘first law of functional 
finance’ implies that the government should ‘fine-tune’ total expenditure within the economy at the level that 
equalises total expenditure and the total supply of goods and services. Whether this resulted in a budget deficit 
was irrelevant (Lerner, 1943).  
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Keynes’s proposed ordinary and capital budgets. They noted that while Keynes opposed 
deficit-financed current expenditure, public investment was to be at least partly debt-
financed and repaid over the service life of the project. 
Brown-Collier and Collier (1995: 342-43, 350) also emphasised that Keynes’s policy 
position did not call for direct government control or influence over private investment 
(however, this overlooks Keynes’s support for a policy of permanently low interest rates; 
see Section 3.1). Instead, public investment would add to private investment (in the absence 
of any crowding out effect), with the level of public investment determined by the shortfall 
of private investment relative to the full employment level of savings. 
Chapter 2 has reviewed the secondary literature that has examined Keynes’s policy position. 
The body of literature that has been informed by the Treasury Memoranda stands in contrast 
to the conventional understanding of Keynesian economic policy. Keynes is shown to have 
supported a full employment policy based around a preventative (or anti-cyclical) long-term 
government expenditure program. At the same time, Keynes was opposed to deficit-
financed current government expenditures and thereby somewhat conservative regarding 
public debt. Chapter 3 analyses the relevant primary materials with a particular focus on the 
1942-45 Treasury Memoranda. 
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Chapter 3. A reappraisal of Keynes’s core policy position 
It was shown in Chapter 2 that while the conventional characterisation of Keynesian 
economic policy places an emphasis on short-run fiscal activism, a reconstruction of the 
primary literature reveals that Keynes advocated a long-term policy for achieving full 
employment through an expanded public investment program. This chapter examines the 
relevant primary materials with an emphasis on the 1942-45 Treasury Memoranda. While 
this chapter confirms the central message of the secondary literature, it also attempts to 
ascertain those features of Keynes’s policy position that were of a general character and 
those that were more contingent upon Keynes’s historical and political context. The 
characterisation of Keynes’s policy position in this chapter motivates the illustrative 
modelling in Chapter 4. 
As a starting point, Keynes’s position on the role of fiscal policy is based on the central 
theoretical proposition in the General Theory. In a decentralised, capitalist economy there is 
no reliable, automatic mechanism that coordinates investment and savings in such a way as 
to guarantee that the system will adjust to full-employment output (Aspromourgos, 2011). 
Moreover, a modern economic system exhibits a persistent tendency towards aggregate 
demand deficiency, giving rise to involuntary unemployment. In refuting the ‘classical 
theory’, Keynes observed that even with flexible prices and money-wages the economic 
system ‘seems capable of remaining in a chronic condition of sub-normal activity for a 
considerable period’ and that ‘full, or even approximately full, employment is of rare and 
short-lived occurrence’ (GT: 249-50). By demonstrating the possibility of systematic 
demand deficiency in a capitalist economy the General Theory provided the theoretical 
underpinning for an activist role for the state in maintaining full employment.  
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Section 3.1 begins by examining several of the key policy proposals that are evident in the 
General Theory itself. Section 3.2 then analyses the key features of Keynes’s policy position 
that are depicted in the Treasury Memoranda. 
3.1 Keynes’s ‘Social Philosophy’ in Chapter 24 of the General Theory 
As previously noted, the General Theory is largely a theoretical text and Keynes gives only 
secondary attention to policy issues. He makes several references to the employment 
expanding effects of public works programs in Chapter 10 (GT: 116-17, 119-20, 127-131) 
and once in the Appendix to Chapter 19 (GT: 277). Also, Keynes makes only two references 
to the word ‘deficit’. The first reference appears in Chapter 8 where Keynes notes how, as 
an endogenous consequence of a decline in employment, a government may be liable 
‘willingly or unwillingly, to run into a budgetary deficit or will provide unemployment 
relief; for example, out of borrowed money’ (GT: 98). The second reference appears in 
Chapter 10 in the context of the infamous (and slightly facetious) description of burying 
bottles filled with banknotes. Keynes distinguishes between two forms of government loan 
expenditures: net borrowings on the capital budget (that is, public investment spending), and 
net borrowings to meet a current budgetary deficit (GT: 128-29, n.). In the main part of the 
text there is no explicit endorsement of budgetary deficits or discretionary demand 
management. 
In Chapter 24 of the General Theory Keynes provides a commentary on the long-term 
policies that he envisaged as being desirable to maintain full employment in a liberal 
capitalist economy. He begins the chapter by claiming that the ‘outstanding faults of the 
economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its 
arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes’ (GT: 372). Towards remedying 
these faults, three key policy proposals emerge from Chapter 24: policies to improve the 
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distribution of income and wealth, a scheme of permanently low interest rates, and a 
permanent enlargement of the public sector (with an emphasis on public investment). 
Firstly, Keynes endorsed policies to redistribute income. He clearly objected to the 
inequality in the distribution of income caused by modern capitalism on both ethical as well 
as economic grounds. According to Keynes, a more equal distribution of income (achieved 
through, for instance, direct taxation such as income tax and death duties) was central to 
increasing the propensity to consume and the multiplier (GT: 372-73; cf. 94). This was a 
long-run policy. Keynes was actually sceptical of the ability of short-run fiscal changes to 
influence current consumption (cf. CW27: 319, 323). On the basis of the theory of effective 
demand Keynes refuted the orthodox proposition that growth in the economy’s capital stock 
depended upon the strength of the motive towards individual saving (especially the 
‘abstinence of the rich’), arguing instead that ‘the growth of capital depends not at all on a 
low propensity to consume but is, on the contrary, held back by it’ (GT: 372-73). However, 
Keynes acknowledged that there was ‘social and psychological justification for significant 
inequalities of income and wealth’, although ‘not for such large disparities as exist to-day’ 
(GT: 374). 
Secondly, Keynes advocated a long-run policy of systematically reducing the riskless real 
interest rate towards zero.12 This is Keynes’s ‘euthanasia of the rentier’ or ‘the functionless 
investor’ (GT: 376). Granted an inverse relation between the interest rate and investment, a 
permanently low rate of interest (or ‘cheap money’ policy) could induce a volume of private 
investment equal to the magnitude of savings at full employment (GT: 375). Keynes argued 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 However entrepreneurship – such as risk-bearing – would still need to be remunerated. Given a divergence 
between real and nominal yields, a zero real rate would perhaps not be so radical (Aspromourgos, 2004: 219-
20, 232). 
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that because ‘the extent of effective saving is necessarily determined by the scale of 
investment and that the scale of investment is promoted by a low rate of interest’ it followed 
that ‘it is to our best advantage to reduce the rate of interest to that point relatively to the 
schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital at which there is full employment’ (ibid.). 
According to Keynes, the progressive growth in the capital stock would gradually diminish 
the marginal efficiency of capital (note that Keynes does conceive of the long-run 
possibility of capital satiation; cf. CW27: 350).  
Keynes’s conclusion that savings and investment were equilibrated by the aggregate level of 
activity (rather than the interest rate), led him to suppose that the general rate of interest was 
conventionally determined (GT: 202-04; cf. Aspromourgos, 2004; 2007). This opened up a 
role for the monetary authority to autonomously set interest rates as part of a ‘cheap money’ 
policy. Such a policy would have practical advantages for the sustainability of public debt 
and budget deficits.13 This is returned to in Section 4.3. 
Keynes was opposed to short-run interest rate activism (that is, monetary policy employed 
for counter-cyclical purposes) and expressed doubts about the adequacy of monetary policy 
to exercise a decisive influence on private demand (GT: 164, 202-08, 315-21, 378). Keynes 
believed that fluctuations in market expectations of the marginal efficiency of capital would 
exert the most influence on private investment, which could not be practically offset by 
short-run changes in the rate of interest (GT: 319-20). Whilst Keynes advocated 
permanently low interest rates to induce private investment, he nevertheless believed that it 
would not be the case that ‘the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest will be 
sufficient by itself to determine an optimum rate of investment’ (GT: 378). For this reason, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For a discussion of the ‘cheap money’ policy of the British Labour Governments of 1945-51 see Howson 
(1987). 
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Keynes anticipated that the state would take a greater responsibility for implementing a 
sufficient level of investment to maintain full employment (GT: 163-64, 377-81).  
The third important policy proposal articulated in Chapter 24 of the General Theory 
concerns the role of fiscal policy in expanding public expenditure. Keynes understood that 
demand deficiency and chronic unemployment were persistent problems in a modern 
economic system. To this effect, Keynes contended that the only means of securing full 
employment was through a long-term program of state intervention entailing a permanently 
enlarged public sector (combined with low interest rates). Keynes envisaged a long-term 
role for the state direction of investment, which he referred to as the ‘socialisation’ of 
investment (GT: 378). By influencing investment spending through public or semi-public 
bodies, the government could grow effective demand at a rate consistent with the full 
employment level of savings, so as to ensure full employment (CW27: 321). 
Despite the nomenclature, Keynes’s proposal for the ‘socialisation’ of investment was by no 
means an argument in favour of state ownership of the factors of production.14 While he did 
conceive of some ‘central controls’ and an ‘extension of the traditional functions of 
government’, Keynes made it clear that ‘no obvious case is made out for a system of State 
Socialism’ and that ‘it is not the ownership of the instruments of production which it is 
important for the State to assume’ (GT: 378). Keynes saw the state as filling the vacant 
position of ‘entrepreneur-in-chief’ without interfering with the actual ownership or 
management of individual businesses (CW27: 324). In the tradition of British liberalism, 
Keynes still retained a central role for the advantages of individualism, such as economic 
efficiency and decentralisation (GT: 380). Keynes supported the enlargement of the public 
sector as the solution to the ‘disease’ of unemployment and ‘the only practicable means of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This is well documented; cf. Meltzer (1983: 71), Kregel (1985: 30), Smithin (1989: 212). 
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avoiding the destruction of existing economic forms in their entirety and as the condition of 
the successful functioning of individual initiative’ (GT: 380, 381). 
However, Keynes’s ‘socialisation’ of investment should be treated with caution. His 
preference for public investment was a policy position developed contingent on the 
particular context of Britain in the 1930s and 1940s. This theme will be returned to in the 
next section of this chapter. Having outlined the policy proposals that Keynes posited in the 
General Theory, Section 3.2 provides further detail by reference to the 1940s policy 
documents. 
3.2 Keynes’s policy proposals for the post-war world 
The remainder of this chapter examines Keynes’s relevant policy writings contained in the 
Treasury Memoranda. These documents arose out of policy planning for the post-war 
world. There are several issues that are of relevance to this thesis. The first is a clarification 
of Keynes’s notion of the ‘socialisation’ of investment. The second to be examined is 
Keynes’s emphasis on maintaining full employment by preventing economic fluctuations 
through anti-cyclical policies. The third issue is Keynes’s preference for investment 
spending over consumption manipulation. Fourth is the question of the financing of public 
expenditures, including a discussion of capital budgeting and Keynes’s apparent 
conservatism towards public debt and budget deficits. A fifth related issue to be addressed is 
Keynes’s preference for policies of a ‘user-pays’ character. 
To the first issue, and as discussed above, Keynes supported an expansion in the scale of the 
public sector as the means of achieving full employment. In the 1930s and 1940s Keynes’s 
emphasis was on a long-term program of public investment, or the ‘socialisation’ of 
investment. This was grounded on the theoretical proposition that fluctuations in private 
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investment were the primary cause of changes in effective demand, namely because 
investment is ‘influenced by our views of the future about which we know so little’ 
(Keynes, 1937: 221). Responding to criticisms of the General Theory, Keynes (1937) wrote:	  
The theory can be summed up by saying that, given the psychology of the public, the 
level of output and employment as a whole depends on the amount of investment. I 
put it in this way, not because this is the only factor on which aggregate output 
depends, but because it is usual in a complex system to regard as the causa causans 
that factor which is most prone to sudden and wide fluctuation. (Keynes, 1937: 221) 
In the absence of any reliable mechanisms in a decentralised competitive economy for 
ensuring full labour employment, Keynes’s solution was the permanent expansion of public 
expenditure. According to Keynes, public investment should offset changes in private 
demand, of which investment was the most volatile component. In this regard, the level of 
public investment would be determined by the shortfall in private investment as compared 
with the level of savings corresponding to full-employment output (CW27: 321). 
Keynes envisaged the long-term investment program to be undertaken by ‘public or semi-
public bodies’ (CW27: 322). In the tradition of British liberalism, Keynes looked to 
decentralised government entities and semi-autonomous public bodies operating under 
government auspices, including levels of government below the national level. In an earlier 
article, The End of Laissez-Faire, Keynes (1926) had already alluded to what he understood 
to be public or semi-public bodies:15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Kregel (1985), Pressman (1987), Smithin (1989) and Seccareccia (1995) have all clarified Keynes’s notion 
of ‘public or semi-public bodies’ by reference to The End of Laissez-Faire, noting its continuity with Keynes’s 
later policy proposals. 
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…in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control and organisation lies 
somewhere between the individual and the modern state. I suggest therefore, that 
progress lies in the growth and the recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within 
the state – bodies whose criterion of action within their own field is solely the public 
good as they understand it…I propose a return, it may be said, towards medieval 
conceptions of separate autonomies. But in England at any rate, corporations are a 
mode of government which has never ceased to be important…It is easy to give 
examples, from what already exists, of separate autonomies which have attained or 
are approaching the mode I designate – the universities, the Bank of England, the 
Port of London Authority, even perhaps the railway companies. (Keynes, 1926: 288-
89) 
Seccreccia (1995: 48-52) argued that part of the institutional setting that Keynes envisaged 
may have been contained in his proposal for the establishment of a National Investment 
Board after the 1930s. The Board would behave in a similar way to a publicly run 
investment bank, making available the pooled funds from public and semi-public bodies and 
engaging in long-term financing of investment projects. Skidelsky (2010: 177) considered 
these arrangements as being somewhat analogous to ‘public-private’ partnerships. 
Keynes gave few specific details about the precise characteristics of the kind of public 
investment that he supported. He does make brief mention in the General Theory to public 
investment in road-building and house-building (GT: 106). At a broader level, Keynes 
(1926: 291) argued that public expenditures should be directed at ‘those things which at 
present are not done at all’ by private enterprise. The significant criteria should be whether 
the project would provide a real return over time, either as a direct cash return or an indirect 
flow of services (CW27: 407-08). Pressman (1987: 17) suggested that the sorts of 
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investment that would meet Keynes’s criteria would include rebuilding Britain’s 
infrastructure (a priority following World War II), clearing slums, providing low-income 
housing and building and operating hospitals and schools. 
The second important characteristic of Keynes’s policy position was that public investment 
expenditures would be directed at maintaining full employment by preventing business 
cycle fluctuations. Keynes saw a difference between preventative or anti-cyclical policy 
(presumably entailing some forecast of future private investment demand), and a 
conventional counter-cyclical policy that would respond to fluctuations in private demand 
as they occurred.16 Government action at the margin could accelerate or delay investment 
projects to expand or curtail public investment expenditure. According to Keynes, measures 
to prevent economic fluctuations were justified on the basis that it was typically difficult to 
offset sharp fluctuations once they had occurred (CW27: 316, 323). In a 1943 memorandum 
Keynes argued that: 
If two-thirds or three-quarters of total investment is carried out or can be influenced 
by public or semi-public bodies, a long-term programme of a stable character should 
be capable of reducing the potential range of fluctuations to much narrower limits 
than formerly, when a smaller volume of investment was under public control and 
when even this part tended to follow, rather than correct, fluctuations of investment 
in the strictly private sector of the economy...The main task should be to prevent 
fluctuations by a stable long-term programme. If this is successful it should not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See footnote 5. While there may be only slight practical differences in how an anti-cyclical policy is 
implemented compared with a counter-cyclical policy, the importance of the distinction is to highlight that 
Keynes’s primary focus is with preventing fluctuations in total demand. 
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too difficult to offset small fluctuations by expediting or retarding some items in this 
long-term programme. (CW27: 322; cf. 326) 
Given the growth in the size of public sectors in developed economies over the post-war 
period Keynes’s proposals may not have been so unrealistic. Assuming a constant 
proportion of investment to national income, Keynes estimated that public investment was 
likely to range from 7.5 percent to 20 percent of net national income – certainly a 
conceivable range for the total public sector share of activity in developed countries (CW27: 
323). In general however, economic policies in the post-war period did not match the 
character of Keynes’s policy proposals, at least so far as his preference for public 
investment spending was concerned. The literature suggests that over the post-war period 
public investment decreased as a share of total investment and total output, and was not 
being used in a way to stabilise total investment.17 At the same time, taxation changes were 
the main policy instrument for influencing economic activity. Transfer payments also rose 
as a share of public outlays.18 Nevertheless, Aspromourgos (2011) argued that the growth in 
the size of the public sectors in developed countries over the post-war period has on some 
level been a realisation of Keynes’s vision, even if occurring for other reasons. These 
include the increasing share of tertiary services in expenditure that accompanies rising 
living standards, together with imperatives to state provision of at least part of these (such as 
education and healthcare). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See for instance Pressman (1987), Kregel (1985), Smithin (1989), and Brown-Collier and Collier (1995) 
18 See Kregel (1985: 30-31, 41-44) in particular. See also Clarke (2009: 168-176), who highlighted the 
different trajectories followed by British and American Keynesianism, especially the greater emphasis that 
American Keynesianism placed on manipulating consumption through ‘tax-and-spend’ policies. 
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The third aspect of Keynes’s policy position is his preference for investment spending rather 
than manipulating current consumption. At least part of this is grounded on Keynes’s 
theoretical understanding that private investment fluctuations were the main cause of 
macroeconomic volatility. Rather than supporting the fine-tuning of current expenditure, 
Keynes questioned the practicality of policies to expand private consumption, noting that ‘I 
doubt if much is to be hoped from proposals to offset unforeseen short-period fluctuations in 
investment by stimulating short-period changes in consumption’ (CW27: 323; cf. 319).  In a 
1943 letter to James Meade, Keynes observed that short-run variations in current 
government expenditure would interfere with people’s established habits and consumption 
patterns. Ironically, Keynes’s position reads almost like an endorsement of the permanent 
income hypothesis, which later came to constitute part of the assault on Keynesian 
economics: 
People have established standards of life. Nothing will upset them more than to be 
subject to pressure constantly to vary them up and down. A remission of taxation on 
which people could only rely for an indefinitely short period might have very limited 
effects in stimulating their consumption. And, if it was successful, it would be 
extraordinarily difficult from the political angle to reimpose the taxation again when 
employment improved. (CW27: 319; cf. 350) 
Keynes is pragmatic in recognising the political and practical advantages of public 
investment spending over consumption manipulation. He also contended that capital 
expenditure could have a greater effect on an economy during a recession compared with 
programs to stimulate household consumption: ‘it is not nearly so easy politically and to the 
common man to put across the encouragement of consumption in bad times as it is to induce 
the encouragement of capital expenditure’ (CW27: 319). 
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However, Keynes does not fully acknowledge the impact time-lags typical of large-scale 
public investment projects. To the extent that Keynes already envisaged the public 
investment program would prevent rather than respond to cyclical fluctuations this would 
have required a very forward-looking policy regime. Presumably, Keynes anticipated that 
specific government machinery would have been in place so that public investment 
programs at the margin could be immediately implemented or curtailed.  
The only exception that Keynes made to his preference for investment spending related to 
Meade’s proposal for a rules-based National Insurance contribution scheme, resembling 
something like a modern budgetary automatic stabiliser. Meade’s proposal was to use a 
formula for reducing social security taxes on workers when the unemployment rate rose 
above 8 percent (CW27: 206-08, 312, 319). Contrary to the conventional understanding of 
Keynesian fiscal policy, as noted above Keynes generally disapproved of discretionary 
fiscal stimulus to influence current consumption. Seen in this light, Meltzer (1981: 42) 
argued that Keynes’s policies amount to a ‘mixture of rules, based on his theory, and 
pragmatism [rather] than as ad hoc changes’. 
However, Keynes’s apparent preference for public capital expenditure should be clarified by 
noting that it was largely a contingent conviction arising from the context of post-war 
reconstruction facing Britain in the early 1940s together with Keynes’s views on ‘capital 
saturation’.19 In a 1943 memorandum Keynes anticipated ‘three phases’ at the end of World 
War II: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 There are references to this point in some of the secondary literature, but in general Keynes’s preference for 
investment spending is somewhat overstated; cf. Kregel (1985: 35), Guger and Walterskirchen (1988: 107-08), 
and Pérez Caldentey (2003: 35-38). 
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(i) When the inducement to investment is likely to lead, if unchecked, to a volume of 
investment greater than the indicated level of savings in the absence of rationing and 
other controls; 
(ii) When the urgently necessary investment is no longer greater than the indicated 
level of savings in conditions of freedom, but is still capable of being adjusted to the 
indicated level by deliberately encouraging or expediting less urgent, but 
nevertheless useful investment; 
(iii) When the investment demand is so far saturated that it cannot be brought up to 
the indicated level of savings without embarking upon wasteful and unnecessary 
enterprises. (CW27: 321) 
In the first phase of post-war reconstruction Keynes envisaged an excess of investment 
demand over the indicated level of savings.20 Equilibrium could only be achieved by 
limiting the volume of investment and consumption through state controls and rationing 
(CW27: 322). Keynes anticipated this phase would last approximately five years. 
The second phase after the War would be characterised by a deficiency of private 
investment demand relative to the indicated level of savings.21 Keynes’s proposals for the 
socialisation of investment were directed primarily at this second phase (cf. Guger and 
Walterskirchen, 1988; Pérez Caldentey, 2003). To this extent the secondary literature has 
overstated the importance that Keynes gave to investment spending as a general principle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Keynes defined the ‘indicated level of savings’ as the savings level where total expenditure was equal to the 
full employment level of income (CW27: 321). 
21 Guger and Walterskirchen (1988: 107-08) suggested that the second phase would have corresponded to the 
1950s and 1960s. 
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(cf. Meltzer, 1981; Kregel, 1985; Brown-Collier and Collier, 1995). Keynes envisaged that 
this second phase could last for between five and twenty years (CW27: 323, 350).  
Keynes’s preference for public capital investment was in some ways grounded on his belief 
that the economy was yet to reach ‘capital saturation’: the point at which capital would 
become so abundant that the yield on capital would only cover production costs 
(Moggridge, 1979: 211). Pérez Caldentey (2003: 35-38) argued that Keynes’s 
recommendation for public investment spending was only applicable up until the saturation 
point of investment. In a 1943 letter to Josiah Wedgwood, a fellow director at the Bank of 
England, Keynes addressed the question of why he should prefer a ‘heavy scale of 
investment to increasing consumption’: 
My main reason for this is that I do not think we have yet reached anything like the 
point of capital saturation. It would be in the interests of the standards of life in the 
long run if we increased our capital quite materially. After twenty-years of large-
scale investment I should expected to have to change my mind. Even in the 
meanwhile it is a question of degree. But certainly for the first ten years after the war 
– and I should expect for another ten years after that – it would not be in the interests 
of the community to encourage more expenditure on food and drink at the expense 
of expenditure on housing. (CW27: 350) 
In the third phase, a sort of ‘golden age’ at which point investment demand would be 
satiated, government policy would shift towards discouraging savings and increasing 
consumption expenditure in order to bring savings and investment into equality. Keynes 
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certainly believed in the prospect of capital saturation and consumption satiation.22 
Eventually, it would become necessary to reduce the indicated level of savings by reducing 
labour supply and increasing leisure, such as through more holidays or shorter work hours 
(CW27: 323-24). Hence in the very long term, the economy should be ‘aiming towards a 
steady long-period trend towards a reduction in the scale of investment and an increase in 
the scale of consumption (or, alternatively, of leisure)’ (CW27: 324).  
The fourth issue relating to Keynes’s long-term policy position is the question of financing 
public expenditures. The proposal to institute a formal distinction between current and 
capital public expenditure serves to highlight Keynes’s somewhat conservative views on 
public debt, even though he conceded it was really ‘no more than a matter of presentation’ 
(CW27: 352). Compared with the secondary literature, this thesis puts more emphasis on the 
implications that Keynes’s views on deficit spending have on issues related to public debt.  
Keynes proposed that there should be an ‘ordinary budget’ and a ‘capital budget’ reflecting 
the separation of current from capital items, respectively. The ordinary budget should 
contain current expenditures and revenues, and be balanced or in surplus.23 Any surplus 
should be transferred to the capital budget, not to extinguish debt, but to expand capital 
expenditures that would generate a real return over time (CW27: 225, 277, 352). Keynes 
defined a capital budget as ‘a regular survey and analysis of the relationship between 
sources of savings and different types of investment and a balance sheet showing how they 
have been brought into equality for the past year, and a forecast of the same for the year to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See for instance Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren (Keynes, 1930), which foreshadows that 
‘within a hundred years,’ ‘absolute’ consumption needs (those independent of the situation of others) would 
have been satiated. 
23 The ordinary budget would also record the repayment (or amortization) of public debt; cf. CW27: 407, 410. 
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come’ (CW27: 368). Thus, on the capital budget the government would forecast the shortfall 
of private demand and institute public investment spending to meet the savings-investment 
requirements for full employment. 
Keynes contended that the government should not intentionally run an ordinary budget 
deficit. This would mean that there should be no aggregate public debt issue to debt-finance 
recurrent expenditures (what Keynes refers to as ‘debt-weight debt’). He regarded deficit 
financing on the ordinary budget to be a second-best expedient, possibly available as a final 
recourse if capital budgeting failed to maintain full employment.24 In no way does Keynes 
advocate unqualified deficit spending on the ordinary budget. While public investment on 
the capital budget should at least partly be financed by new borrowing from the public, 
Keynes contended that capital budgeting had ‘nothing whatever to do with deficit financing’ 
(CW27: 352). In this respect Keynes cautioned against ‘confusing the fundamental idea of 
the capital budget with the particular, rather desperate expedient of deficit financing’ 
(CW27: 353-54).  
While the emphasis of Keynes’s policy position was on maintaining full employment he 
does not unequivocally close off the prospect of the government ever having recourse to a 
deficit on the ordinary budget. In a 1943 memorandum Keynes wrote: 
If, for one reason or another, the volume of planned investment fails to produce 
equilibrium, the lack of balance would be met by unbalancing one way or the other 
the current Budget. Admittedly this would be a last resort, only to come into play if 
the machinery of capital budgeting had broken down…Thus the capital budgeting is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Guger and Walterskirchen (1988: 109) suggested that in the third phase following the end of the war, 
Keynes envisaged no escape from deficit budgeting; however, this is unclear. 
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a method of maintaining equilibrium; the deficit budgeting is a means of attempting 
to cure disequilibrium if and when it arises. (CW27: 322-23) 
Despite being reluctant to directly endorse deficit financing (except perhaps in the most 
exceptional of circumstances) Keynes proves to be characteristically pragmatic in a 1943 
memorandum: 
About other forms of deficit financing I am inclined to lie low because I am sure 
that, if serious unemployment does develop, deficit financing is absolutely certain to 
happen, and I should like to keep free to object hereafter to the more objectionable 
forms of it. (CW27: 353) 
The exception to Keynes’s aversion towards deficit budgeting is Meade’s social security 
proposal (CW27: 277, 319, 353). In this case, Keynes argued that the social security budget 
should be one section of the capital budget itself, so as to ensure that the ordinary budget 
would be ‘balanced at all times’ (CW27: 225). 
Keynes recognised that changes in the budget balance were predominately an endogenous 
consequence of the economic cycle. In a 1944 memorandum on post-war employment 
Keynes contended that ‘it is the failure to adopt a remedy for severe cyclical 
unemployment’ which might ‘unstabilise the national budget’ (CW27: 366). He argued that 
there ‘appears to be no glimmer of recognition that measures to stabilise the national income 
are ipso facto measures to stabilise the national budget’ (CW27: 366; cf. Keynes, 1933: 
347). In this sense Keynes saw a budget deficit as the consequence of not achieving full 
employment. 
Keynes’s caution towards budget deficits implies that he was apparently somewhat 
conservative concerning the question of public debt. However it should be noted that 
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Keynes’s aversion to budget deficits was namely an aversion to current budget deficits. He 
did maintain that the government should debt-finance capital expenditures (as well as 
relying on user-charges to funding public investment). In this way Keynes appears to have 
been opposed to rising public debt insofar as it reflected debt-financed current expenditures, 
or ‘dead-weight debt’. But even in this sense it is probably unwise to treat Keynes’s 
apparent debt conservatism as a general principle (Aspromourgos, 2011). At one point he 
appeared to have been unconcerned about the growth in ‘dead-weight debt’ that was ‘neither 
large in itself nor out of proportion to the growth of the national income’ (CW27: 278). 
Further, upon reading Lerner’s (1943) article on ‘functional finance’ that took a very 
relaxed approach to rising public debt, Keynes described it as ‘impeccable’ (CW27: 320). 
Moreover, and as a matter of historical context, by the end of World War II the public debt 
burden in Britain was well in excess of 200 percent of GDP. In this regard there would 
appear to have been a clear economic and political imperative to balance the budget. 
A fifth aspect of Keynes’s policy position is that he appeared to have favoured ‘user-pays’ 
financing of a substantial part of the capital expenditure program. To the extent that housing 
was part of Keynes’s investment proposals for instance, it could presumably have been at 
least partly funded by user-charges (CW27: 350-51). In general, Keynes contended that 
public investment would effectively pay for itself by generating surpluses on the ordinary 
budget through higher taxation revenue and charges (CW27: 319-20). Keynes claimed that 
‘[t]he more socialised we become, the more important it is to associate as closely as possible 
the cost of particular services with the sources out of which they are provided’ (CW27: 224). 
User-pays financing would also have the effect of reducing the required tax share of 
national income, as well as reducing the extent of required government borrowing. With this 
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in mind, in a 1943 letter to Meade, Keynes explained the advantages of investment 
expenditure: 
Capital expenditure would, at least partially, if not wholly, pay for itself…Moreover, 
the very reason that capital expenditure is capable of paying for itself makes it much 
better budgetwise and does not involve the progressive increase of budgetary 
difficulties, which deficit budgeting for the sake of consumption may bring about, 
or, at any rate, would be accused of bringing about. (CW27: 319-20) 
Chapter 3 has examined Keynes’s core policy position. Keynes supported a permanent 
enlargement of the public sector that would maintain full employment and prevent 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Keynes treated debt-financed expenditures with some degree 
of caution and he opposed deficits on the ordinary budget. While in the 1930s and 1940s 
Keynes’s preferred type of public expenditure was capital investment, this was largely a 
contingent conviction. The next chapter develops an illustrative model that captures the core 
logic of Keynes’s policy position. 
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Chapter 4. A model of Keynes’s policy position 
As has been discussed in the previous chapters, Keynes supported a permanent enlargement 
of the public sector and associated public expenditures that aimed to maintain full 
employment. However, Keynes was also somewhat conservative towards rising public debt. 
To represent Keynes’s central vision, this chapter develops an illustrative model of a public 
expenditure program that aims to maintain full employment but is subject to a public debt 
sustainability constraint. 
To capture the essential character of Keynes’s theory this thesis uses a long-period demand-
led model based on the output ‘super-multiplier’ (Hicks, 1950; cf. Cesaratto, Serrano and 
Stirati, 2003; Aspromourgos, 2004; 2007). Long-period output is determined by the growth 
of autonomous demand, which is assumed to consist only of government expenditure. The 
super-multiplier is determined by the marginal propensity to consume out of after-tax 
income together with an investment accelerator. 
Section 4.1 derives the basic model. In Section 4.2 two policy constraints are imposed to 
capture the core logic of Keynes’s policy objectives. The first constraint ensures that the 
long-period growth rate in public expenditure is consistent with the maintenance of full 
employment. The second constraint is a debt sustainability constraint of the Domar (1944) 
type, which ensures that the long-period public debt-to-GDP ratio is stabilised at a definite 
magnitude. Section 4.3 derives the income tax rate and examines its properties. Section 4.4 
examines the restrictions required for the model to be economically feasible, defined as 
requiring the income tax rate to be between zero and unity. Section 4.5 discusses the 
implications of the model, especially regarding the policy choice of the tax rate and the 
nominal interest rate.  
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4.1 The basic model 
Assume a single commodity, produced by means of homogenous labour and circulating 
capital of the same commodity. Aggregate demand (!), or output in real terms is 
determined by consumption (!), private investment (!) and government expenditure (!). 
For simplicity, a closed economy is assumed. The price level ! is assumed constant. The 
equilibrium equation for ! is: 
! = ! + ! + ! (1) 
The public sector collects taxation revenue (!). Government expenditure (G) is autonomous 
and grows the economy at a rate equal to !. The government can deficit-finance some part 
of its current expenditure by borrowing from the public, with gross public debt (in real 
terms) denoted by !, and the ratio of public debt to nominal GDP (!) given by b. The 
government borrows at a nominal interest rate !   >   0. Alternatively, the government can 
accumulate budget surpluses and accrue a ‘negative’ public debt (! < 0).25 
Real consumption is a positive function of real after-tax private sector income. Total private 
sector income (!) is defined as the sum of the nominal value of aggregate output and 
interest income from holdings of public debt (see Appendix A.1 for a derivation). Define 0   <   !   <   1 as the ratio of private saving to after-tax private sector income (or the marginal 
propensity to save out of after-tax income), and 0   <   !   <   1, where ! is the average income 
tax rate, or the tax share of income (assuming that income tax is the only tax instrument). 
Income tax is levied on both interest income and income from production. Real 
consumption is then given by: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 A practical interpretation of this in contemporary circumstances would be a savings fund, such as a 
‘sovereign wealth fund’. 
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! = 1− ! 1− ! (1+ !)1+ ! − !" ! (2) 
With circulating capital (or equivalently, complete depreciation of fixed capital in each time 
period), private investment is the sum of the replacement requirement of the existing capital 
stock (!"), plus the additional capital requirements determined by firms’ assumed uniform 
expectation of aggregate demand growth (!!). The capital-output ratio (!) is assumed to be 
less than unity and positive to ensure the viability of production, 0 < ! < 1. Private 
investment in real terms is given by an accelerator mechanism so that investment is induced 
by the expected growth in aggregate demand: 
! = ! 1+ !! ! (3) 
Combining equations (1), (2) and (3) gives a Keynesian expression for aggregate demand 
(!) as a function of autonomous expenditure (!) and the super-multiplier: 
! = 11− 1− ! 1− ! (1+ !)1+ ! − !" − ! 1+ !!   ! (4) 
The first bracketed term is the output super-multiplier. The theoretical restriction on the 
denominator of the super-multiplier is that it lies between zero and unity to ensure that the 
multiplier is greater than unity and finite.26 Intuitively, the induced expenditure 
(consumption and investment) resulting from a one-dollar increase in income must be less 
than one dollar.  
The assumption of a closed economy simplifies the analysis and more clearly demonstrates 
the core logic of Keynes’s policy position. However, it is worth noting that Keynes’s Britain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This requires that 0 < 1 − ! 1 − ! (!!!)!!! !!" + ! 1 + !! < 1 
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at the end of World War II had a considerable external debt burden. The model could be 
extended to capture this proposition by introducing an external sector. External debt 
repayments would be a subtraction from national income !, while a net exports component (! −!) could be inserted into equation (1). A positive trade balance at full employment 
would ‘crowd out’ domestic consumption possibilities or government expenditure. In order 
to retain focus on the central nature of Keynes’s policy proposals these possible open 
economy augmentations are put aside.  
This model is useful for illustrative purposes but obviously only has limited generality. One 
limitation of this simplified model is that the government expenditure component does not 
distinguish between current expenditures and capital expenditures. However, given that the 
capital stock is not a variable in the model the distinction between current and capital 
expenditures is not relevant. Further, were some part of ! assimilated into the investment 
accelerator mechanism then this part of public expenditures would become a positive 
function of effective demand, which would not reflect Keynes’s position. Moreover, the 
sorts of investment projects that Keynes proposed, such as infrastructure and residential 
housing, were not really ‘capacity-creating’ in the usual sense of private investment 
spending.   
4.2 The policy constraints 
Two constraints are imposed in order to capture the core logic of Keynes’s policy position. 
The first is a full employment objective and the second is a public debt sustainability 
constraint.  
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(i) Full employment objective 
To maintain full employment the long-period growth in aggregate demand is assumed to be 
equal to the long-period growth rate in the labour force, !. In long-period equilibrium, the 
expected growth in aggregate demand is equal to the actual growth rate, which in turn is 
equal to the growth in the labour force; that is, !! = ! = !. 
(ii) Debt sustainability constraint 
Keynes’s apparent public debt conservatism can be modelled using a Domar (1944) type 
equation for the sustainability of public debt (cf. Aspromourgos, Rees and White, 2010). It 
requires that the long-period public debt-to-GDP ratio (!) is stabilised at some finite value. 
This entails the government maintaining a constant total deficit-to-GDP ratio (that is, 
including interest payments on public debt). For a constant ! interest payments on public 
debt are a stable proportion of GDP. A stable total budget deficit-to-GDP ratio therefore 
implies a stable primary deficit-to-GDP ratio (exclusive of interest payments). Assuming 
some given sustainable public debt burden !, the long-period debt sustainability constraint 
is given by: 
!"! − !"! = (! − !)(1+ !) ! (5) 
where the left-hand side of the equation gives the primary budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. See 
Appendix A.2 for a derivation. 
The primary budget deficit-to-GDP depends on (i) the desired value of the sustainable debt-
to-GDP ratio, !; (ii) the nominal interest rate on government debt, !; and (iii) the economy’s 
growth rate, !. For a positive debt-to-GDP ratio, if ! >   ! the government can maintain a 
sustainable primary deficit, while if ! < ! it must maintain a primary surplus. Adding back 
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interest payments gives an expression for the sustainable total budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. 
From the first condition setting ! = ! gives: 
! + !"(1+ !) = !"(1+ !) (6) 
where ! is the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio. 
Equations (5) and (6) are fairly mechanical characterisations that capture the core logic of 
public debt sustainability and Keynes’s apparent debt conservatism. They give the budget 
deficit-to-GDP ratio that is consistent with a constant public debt-to-GDP ratio. To reflect 
Keynes’s policy position ! could be interpreted as an upper-bound on the government debt 
trajectory or a long-run trend value.27 Taken literally, Keynes’s aversion to current budget 
deficits could be modelled as requiring ! = 0 (although as discussed in Section 3.2 Keynes 
most likely allowed scope for some net debt issue). While requiring a constant public debt-
to-GDP ratio may appear slightly restrictive this requirement still allows for short-run 
deviations in the debt-to-GDP ratio (cf. Aspromourgos, Rees and White, 2010: 436). 
4.3 Solving for the income tax rate 
Conditions (i) and (ii), together with equations (4) and (6), give an expression for the long-
period income tax rate as a function of the other five parameters (see Appendix A.3 for a 
derivation): 
! 1− ! = !"(1+ !)+ ![ 1+ ! − !"] (7) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This leaves aside the question of the transition path towards that long-period sustainable !; which if below 
the current-period debt-to-GDP ratio would entail a difficult path of fiscal restraint; cf. Aspromourgos, Rees & 
White (2010: 441). Regarding the issue of an optimal ! see Aspromourgos, Rees and White (2010: 436-38). 
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Equation (7) is a standard leakages-injections expression. The left-hand side of the equation 
is equal to the private savings-to-GDP ratio. The first term on the right-hand side is equal to 
the total budget deficit-to-GDP ratio (equivalently, the public sector deficit). The second 
term on the right-hand side is equal to the ratio of private investment-to-GDP (see Appendix 
A.3). Equation (7) essentially requires that the public sector deficit (surplus) is equal to the 
private sector surplus (deficit), expressed as a share of total income. Rearranging equation 
(7) gives an expression for the income tax rate !: 
! = 1− 1! !"1+ ! + ! 1+ ! − !"  (8) 
The sensitivity of ! to the five parameters is examined by taking partial derivatives. The 
public debt to-GDP-ratio ! is assumed to be strictly positive. The full results are reported in 
Appendix A.4. There are three cases of interest. 
!"!" = − 1! !1+ ! ! + ! < 0 (9) 
!"!" = 1! !" > 0 (10) 
!"!" = 1! !" − !(1+ !)   ⋛ 0 (11) 
Equation (9) shows a negative relationship between the growth rate ! and the income tax 
rate. As the full-employment growth rate increases, with ! in the investment accelerator the 
share of private investment in income increases. A higher ! also increases the total 
sustainable budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. By equation (7), in order to finance the increase in 
the income share of the public sector deficit and private investment, private savings as a 
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share of income must increase. This requires a lower tax rate (equivalent to a lower tax 
share of income).  
Equation (10) shows a positive relationship between the interest rate on government debt !, 
and the income tax rate for positive values of !. An increase in the interest rate increases 
public debt servicing as a share of income. This means that a smaller proportion of private 
savings are available to finance private investment, so the share of investment in income 
decreases. By equation (6) the total budget deficit-to-GDP ratio must remain unchanged, so 
a higher tax rate is required to divert private savings into taxation revenue.  
The existence of a positive relationship between the income tax rate and the interest rate is 
relevant to public debt sustainability under a ‘cheap money’ policy (see Section 3.1; cf. 
Aspromourgos, 2004; 2007). To the extent that the government can influence the value of 
the nominal interest rate, a lower ! decreases public debt servicing as a share of income, 
allowing for a lower income tax rate for a given total budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. In other 
words, a lower nominal interest rate on public debt can lessen the taxation burden that is 
required to maintain a sustainable public debt ratio. At the same time, a lower interest rate 
provides a basis for higher primary sustainable budget deficits.  
Equation (11) shows that there is an ambiguous relationship between the sustainable public 
debt ratio and the income tax rate. The direction of the relationship between the income tax 
rate and the public debt ratio will depend on the values of the parameters !, ! and !. An 
increase in the public debt ratio results in a decrease in the investment share of income, 
which requires a lower level of private savings and a higher !. At the same time, an increase 
in ! increases the total sustainable budget deficit as a share of income, which requires 
higher private savings and a lower !. Hence the necessary adjustment in private savings as a 
share of income is ambiguous. Where the decrease in the ratio of private investment-to-GDP 
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is greater than the increase in the public sector deficit-to-GDP ratio, then the necessary tax 
rate increases. 
4.4 Restrictions for a feasible income tax rate 
A feasible income tax rate requires that the tax share of income lies between zero and unity, 0 < ! < 1. (This only defines what is economically feasible. Political feasibility may of 
course impose more severe restrictions.) The following conditions are sufficient (although 
not strictly necessary) to ensure a feasible solution for the income tax rate. 
(i) Restriction on the sum of the total budget deficit and private investment 
Using equation (8), a necessary theoretical condition for a feasible income tax rate is: 
0 < !"(1+ !)+ ! 1+ ! − !" < ! (12) 
where 0 < ! < 1.  
The first term in the centre of the inequality is the total sustainable budget deficit-to-GDP 
ratio. The second term is private investment as a share of GDP. The ratio of private saving 
to after-tax income (not total income) is !. That is, for a feasible income tax rate it must be 
that the sum of the total budget deficit and private investment, expressed as shares of total 
income, is strictly positive and less than the ratio of private saving to after-tax income. 
Equation (12) is a variation of the standard leakages-injections expression given in equation 
(7). The two terms in the centre of the inequality in equation (12) give the financing 
requirements of the public and private sectors out of total savings. The total budget deficit 
gives the excess of total government outlays (expenditure plus interest payments) over the 
tax share of income, representing the public sector deficit, financed out of private savings. 
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Similarly, private investment reflects the private sector’s call on private savings. Since the 
ratio of private savings to total income, !(1− !), is less than the ratio of private savings to 
after-tax income, !, then the sum of the total budget deficit and private investment 
(expressed as a share of income) is less than !.  
(ii) Restriction on the super-multiplier to be positive and finite 
As a necessary theoretical restriction to ensure a stable long-period equilibrium, the 
denominator of the super-multiplier in equation (4) is assumed to be between zero and unity. 
Setting ! = ! gives the condition: 
0 < 1− ! 1− ! (1+ !)1+ ! − !" + ! 1+ ! < 1 (13) 
where ! is determined by equation (8). 
(iii) Restriction on private investment as a share of effective demand 
A necessary theoretical restriction is that private investment is less than total demand, so 
that ! 1+ ! < 1.  This also sets a maximum upper-limit on the growth rate equal to the 
ratio of net product to capital input, ! < (1− !)/!. 
(iv) Restriction on private investment as a share of income 
This restriction is assumed to be empirically plausible. It requires that the ratio of private 
investment to income lies between zero and unity; that is: 
0 < ! 1+ ! − !" < 1 (14) 
Given that ! lies between zero and unity, a positive investment share of income in turn 
requires ! > !" − 1 (however a ‘disaster’ scenario where ! < !" − 1 is not inconceivable; 
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for instance, if an economy was contracting at a rate of 10 percent, the nominal interest rate 
was 50 percent and the public debt ratio was 200 percent of GDP). 
4.5 Implications 
The model developed in this chapter captures the central logic of Keynes’s policy position 
in a demand-led-growth setting. It shows how the growth in public expenditures can ensure 
a long-period growth rate in effective demand that is sufficient to maintain full employment. 
The novel feature about this model is the public debt sustainability constraint, which 
requires the public debt-to-GDP ratio to be stabilised at some definite long-period 
magnitude. From Section 4.4, equation (12) is the key restriction that ensures the income tax 
share is economically feasible (and in turn, that the model generates meaningful results). 
This requires that the sum of the total budget deficit-to-GDP ratio and the private 
investment-to-GDP ratio is strictly positive and less than the ratio of private savings to after-
tax income.  
The model can be used to illustrate the choice of policy variables by the government. 
Consider the relationship between the long-period values of the tax share of income (!), the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio (!) and the interest rate (!), given the other variables !, ! and !. If 
two of !, ! and ! are given, by equation (8) the remaining one will also be determined. 
Equation (12) together with equations (13) and (14) defines the combinations of ! and ! 
over the feasible range of ! (with the other parameters given). 
Figures 1–4 (below) represent graphically the region of feasible ! and ! combinations 
consistent with an income tax rate between zero and unity (with !, ! and ! fixed). The 
shaded area corresponds to the region satisfied simultaneously by equations (12), (13) and 
(14). The nominal interest rate is shown on the horizontal axis (from 0 to 50 percent) and 
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the long-period public debt-to-GDP ratio is shown on the vertical axis (from -250 percent to 
+250 percent of GDP). Each combination of ! and ! in the feasible range corresponds to a 
value for the income tax rate necessary for debt sustainability.  
Figures 1 and 2 show that with a relatively high savings rate, the government has a 
relatively large range from which to choose ! and !. In Figure 3 a lower savings rate 
constrains the choice to a small region of negative values for ! (that is, net public sector 
lending). In Figure 4, with a negative growth rate and a low savings rate the government is 
constrained to positive values for public debt, this being associated with a total budget 
surplus. 
Rather than supposing that some given choice of ! and ! determines the necessary income 
tax rate, it is more meaningful to think in terms of the government autonomously choosing a 
desired value for the income tax rate !. This ensures that the choice of ! is both 
economically feasible as well as allowing policy-makers to choose ! subject to the possibly 
more severe constraint of political feasibility. The most realistic case would involve the 
government autonomously choosing a desired ! together with the nominal interest rate ! 
(where the general level of interest is a convention; cf. Aspromourgos, 2004; 2007). This 
would in turn determine the economy’s long-period public debt ratio !. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the monetary authority can determine the nominal interest 
rate, a lower ! for a given ! reduces the necessary long-period income tax share. As such, 
the model provides a theoretical basis for Keynes’s policy views on ‘cheap money’. 
Systematically decreasing the nominal interest rate has the practical advantage of easing the 
burden of debt servicing on national income. It also allows the government to run a higher 
primary budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. However, scope for such a policy would be restricted 
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in more real-world cases with open capital markets and inflation-targeting monetary policy 
(Aspromourgos, 2004: 232). 
One limitation of this model is that ! and ! are implicitly assumed to be independent. The 
model would appear to be somewhat optimistic to the extent that it suggests the government 
can maintain a seemingly very high long-period public debt ratio at the same time as a very 
high interest rate (see Figure 1, for example). Aspromourgos, Rees and White (2010) note 
that more realistically, the sustainable limit on ! would be constrained by the potential rise 
in interest rates that the private sector would require for holding higher levels of public debt. 
In this way it is unlikely that ! and ! would be independent. A possible extension to the 
model would be to specify a functional relationship between the private sector’s willingness 
to hold public debt and the interest rate on debt. 
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Figure 1. ! = 0.05,  ! = 0.3,  ! = 0.5 Figure 2. ! = −0.05, ! = 0.3, ! = 0.5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. ! = 0.05, ! = 0.3, ! = 0.3 Figure 4. ! = −0.05, ! = 0.3, ! = 0.3 
 
Shaded area corresponds to the solutions satisfied simultaneously by the following three inequalities: 
(i) Equation (12): 0 < !"(!!!) + ! 1 + ! − !" < ! 
(ii) Equation (13): 0 < !" !!!!!! + ! 1 + ! − !" < ! !!! !!"(!!!)   (defining ! by equation (8)) 
(iii) Equation (14): 0 < ! 1 + ! − !" < 1 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
The Global Financial Crisis led to a brief resurgence of interest in Keynes’s economics and 
policy. Keynes’s name was popularly invoked to describe the character of policies that were 
implemented in response to the sharp macroeconomic contractions throughout developed 
countries. While he is commonly understood to have called for short-run fiscal activism and 
budget deficits, this was not Keynes’s actual policy position. This thesis has re-examined 
Keynes’s economic policy proposals relating to government expenditure, public debt and 
budget deficits. In contrast to the conventional characterisation of Keynesian policies, 
Keynes did not support temporary, discretionary debt-financed fiscal policy.  
In light of the economic policy debates in recent years this thesis has clarified the central 
features of Keynes’s policy position. Of course, there are inherent difficulties in attempting 
to reconstruct what Keynes said. While it might be alleged that Keynes ‘changed his mind’ 
or was inconsistent on fiscal policy issues, there is a remarkable degree of continuity 
between his views in the General Theory and his later policy writings in the Treasury 
Memoranda. Moreover, a worthwhile future research question would be examining how the 
policies of mainstream Keynesian economics came to diverge from Keynes’s position. In 
particular, how Abba Lerner’s theory of ‘functional finance’ came to be associated with the 
common understanding of Keynesian economic policies is a question that warrants future 
exploration. 
One contribution that this thesis makes to the literature is to more closely examine Keynes’s 
post-war policy proposals with a view to distinguishing Keynes’s somewhat more 
contingent proposals. While the secondary literature places a significant emphasis on 
Keynes’s apparent preference for public investment spending over consumption 
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expenditure, Keynes did not see this as a general principle. More likely, Keynes’s proposal 
for the ‘socialisation’ of investment was a product of his views on capital saturation and the 
imperative of post-war reconstruction. More generally, Keynes’s understanding that 
aggregate demand-deficiency was a persistent problem in a modern capitalist economy led 
him to support a permanent enlargement of the public sector. 
The second main contribution of this thesis is to develop an illustrative model that captures 
Keynes’s central policy position in a demand-led growth setting. The long-period model in 
Chapter 4 shows how the government can maintain full employment where public 
expenditure is subject to a debt sustainability constraint. Using a Domar-type condition for 
public debt sustainability is a tractable way of capturing Keynes’s apparent debt 
conservatism. The model can be used to show that each combination of the public debt ratio 
and the interest rate determines a value for the tax share of income (with the other 
parameters given). Allowing the government to choose a desired income tax rate together 
with an interest rate effectively determines the magnitude of the long-period public debt 
ratio for the economy. The model also provides a theoretical basis for a ‘cheap money’ 
policy, where a lower interest rate decreases the tax rate that is required for debt 
sustainability.   
With the revival of interest in Keynes following the Global Financial Crisis, much has been 
written about what Keynes ‘would have thought’ of the responses of Western governments 
to the global recession. Clarke (2009: 177) described such questions as ‘anachronistic 
ventriloquism’. While this thesis has shown that Keynes was generally opposed to short-run 
fiscal activism, Keynes’s core policy vision was for a permanent enlargement of the public 
sector that would have prevented macroeconomic fluctuations from occurring in the first 
place. In this sense, having recourse to debt-financed public expenditure during a recession 
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was a second-best expedient for Keynes, although nevertheless one that may have been 
available. In this regard, a reappraisal of Keynes’s policy views is both timely and relevant 
in the context of current debates concerning long-term fiscal sustainability and public debt 
in developed countries. After all, it was Keynes himself who infamously stated that ‘the 
ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are 
wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little 
else’ (GT: 383). 
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Appendix 
A.1 Derivation of nominal GDP (!!) in terms of !! 
Nominal GDP at time ! is equal to the money value of output, plus interest income earned 
on public debt in the previous period: 
!! = !!! + !!!!!!!!! 
Where !!!! = !!!!! !!!!, and !!!!! is the value of public debt at time ! − 1. The price 
level ! is assumed constant. With the GDP growth rate equal to !, !!!! = !! (1+ !) then: 
!! = !!! + !!!!!!!(1+ !) 
which simplifies to: 
!! = 1+ !1+ ! − !!!!! !!! 
Assuming a constant public debt-to-GDP ratio, in long-period equilibrium: 
! = 1+ !1+ ! − !" !" (A1) 
A.2 Derivation of the debt sustainability constraint28  
The government budget constraint is given by: 
!!!! = !!!! − !!!! + 1+ ! !! 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Based on Aspromourgos, Rees and White (2010: 434-36) 
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where all variables are expressed in real terms. To express in money-terms as a share of 
nominal GDP, multiply through by the price level ! and divide by !!!! to get: 
!!!!!!!!! = !(!!!! − !!!!)!!!! + 1+ ! !"!!!!!  
Noting that !!!! = 1+ ! !! and using lower case letters to denote ratios to nominal GDP,  
!!!! = !!!! + 1+ !(1+ !) !! 
Where !!!! is the primary budget deficit-to-GDP ratio (that is, exclusive of interest 
repayments) at time ! + 1. Subtracting !! from both sides: 
!!!! − !! = !!!! + 1+ !1+ ! !! − !! =   !!!! + ! − !1+ ! !! 
For a constant public debt-to-GDP ratio let !!!! = !! and rearrange to give the long-period 
debt sustainability condition: 
! = (! − !)(1+ !) ! (A2) 
To find the sustainable total budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, add back in the interest payments 
accruing on public debt in the previous period !"!! = !"!! and expressing as a share of !!!! 
!!!! + !"!!!!!! =    ! − !1+ ! !! + !"!!!!!!  
Since !!!! = 1+ ! !! this simplifies to give the long-period total budget deficit-to-GDP: 
! + !"(1+ !) = !"(1+ !) (A3) 
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A.3 Solving for the income tax rate 
Find an expression for the total budget deficit-to-GDP ratio and equate this with equation 
(A3).  At time ! the total budget deficit (expressed in real terms) is given by: 
!! − !! + !"!!!!!  
Noting that !!!! = !! (1+ !), and expressing in nominal terms as shares of !!, this gives: 
!"!!! − !"!!! + !"(1+ !) 
Using the expression for the output super-multiplier in equation (4), and substituting in ! = !! = ! gives: 
1− !"(1+ !)− 1− ! 1− ! − ![ 1+ ! − !"] − ! + !"(1+ !) 
where the first-term in braces is equal to !" ! and !"/! = !. Equating this with (A3) and 
solving for the income tax rate !: 
! 1− ! = !"(1+ !)+ ![ 1+ ! − !"] (A4) 
Note that the second term on the right-hand side of equation (A4) is the ratio of private 
investment-to-GDP, given by: 
!"! = ! 1+ ! !"(1+ !)1+ ! − !" !" 
!"! = ![ 1+ ! − !"] (A5) 
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A.4 Sensitivity of ! to the other parameters 
Taking partial derivatives of ! with respect to the other model parameters gives: 
!"!" = − 1! 1+ ! − !" < 0 
!"!" = − 1! !1+ ! ! + ! < 0 
!"!" = 1! !" > 0 
!"!" = 1!! !"1+ ! + ! 1+ ! − !" > 0 
!"!" = 1! !" − !(1+ !)   ⋛ 0 
          !"  !" > !(!!!)   ⇒    !"!" > 0 
          !"  !" < !(!!!)   ⇒    !"!" < 0 
 
 64. 
	  
References 
Aspromourgos, T. 2004. ‘The Functionless Investor’: Keynes’s Euthanasia of the Rentier 
Revisited, in T. Aspromourgos and J. Lodewijks (eds.), History and Political Economy: 
Essays in Honour of P. D. Groenewegen, Routledge, London, 218-235 
Aspromourgos, T. 2007. Interest as an Artefact of Self-validating Central Bank Beliefs, 
Metroeconomica, vol. 58, no. 4, 514–535 
Aspromourgos, T., Rees, D., and White, G. 2010. Public debt sustainability and alternative 
theories of interest, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 34, no. 3, 433-447 
Aspromourgos, T. 2011. Keynes’s General Theory After 75 Years: Chapter 24 and the 
Character of ‘Keynesian’ Policy, paper presented at the Australian Conference of 
Economists, Australian National University, Canberra, 11-14 July 2011 
Backhouse, R. E. and Bateman, B. W. 2008. Keynesianism, in S. Durlauf and L. E. Blume 
(eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd ed.) Palgrave Macmillan, London 
Bateman, B. W. 2005. Scholarship in Deficit: Buchanan and Wagner on John Maynard 
Keynes, History of Political Economy, vol. 37, no. 2, 185-190 
Barro, R. J. 1974. Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? Journal of Political Economy, vol. 
82, no. 6, 1095-1117 
Bidel, P. 2008. Public works, in S. Durlauf and L. E. Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics (2nd ed.) Palgrave Macmillan, London 
Blanchard, O. J. 2008. Crowding out, in S. Durlauf and L. E. Blume (eds.), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd ed.) Palgrave Macmillan, London 
Brazelton, W. R. 1980-81. A survey of some textbook misinterpretations of Keynes, Journal 
of Post Keynesian Economics¸ vol. 3, no. 2, 256-270 
Brown-Collier, E. K. and Collier, B. E. 1995. What Keynes Really Said about Deficit 
Spending, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol. 17, no. 3, 341-355  
Buchanan, J. M. and Wagner, R. E. 1977. Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of 
Lord Keynes, Academic Press, New York 
 65. 
	  
Carling, R. 2009. Are We All Keynesians Again? Centre for Independent Studies Issue 
Analysis, no. 106, 12 February 
Cesaratto, S., Serrano, F. and Stirati, A. 2003. Technical Change, Effective Demand and 
Employment, Review of Political Economy, vol. 15, no. 1, 33-52 
Clarke, P. 1988. The Keynesian Revolution in the Making, 1924-1936, Clarendon, Oxford 
Clarke, P. 2009. Keynes: The Rise Fall and Return of the 20th Century’s Most Influential 
Economist, Bloomsbury Press, New York   
Coggington, A. 1976. Keynesian Economics: The Search for First Principles, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 14, no. 4, 1258-1273 
Colander, D. 1984. Was Keynes a Keynesian or a Lernerian? Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. 22, no. 4, 1572-1575 
Colander, D. 1999. Teaching Keynes in the 21st Century, The Journal of Economic 
Education, vol. 30, no. 4, 364-372 
Cunningham, S. R. and Vilasuso, J. 1994. Is Keynesian demand management policy still 
viable? Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol. 17, no. 2, 187-210 
Dalton, H. 1954. Principles of Public Finance, 4th edn, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
Domar, E. D. 1944. The "Burden of the Debt" and the National Income, American 
Economic Review, vol. 34, no. 4, 798-827 
Fox, J. 2008. The Comeback Keynes, Time, 11 October, 60 
Guger, A. and Walterskirchen, E. 1988. Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the Keynes-Kalecki 
Tradition, in J. A. Kregel, E. Matzner and A. Roncaglia (eds.), Barriers to Full Employment, 
Macmillan, London, 103-132 
Hall, P. (ed.) 1989. The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 
Hicks, J. R. 1950, A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
 66. 
	  
Howson, S. 1987. The origins of cheaper money, 1945-7, Economic History Review, New 
Series, vol. 40, no. 3, 433-452 
Hutchison, T. W. 1953. A Review of Economic Doctrines 1870-1929, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2011, World Economic Outlook (September 2011) 
Irvine, J. 2011. Swan proved Keynes works but can he avoid Keynes's curse? Sydney 
Morning Herald, 13 April, 13 
Keynes, J. M. 1926. The End of Laissez-Faire; as repr. in The Collected Writings of John 
Maynard Keynes, vol. 9 (Essays in Persuasion), Macmillan, London (1972), 272-294 
Keynes, J. M. 1929. Can Lloyd George Do It? – The Pledge Examined as repr. in The 
Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. 9 (Essays in Persuasion), Macmillan, 
London (1972), 87-125 
Keynes, J. M. 1930. Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren; as repr. in The 
Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. 9 (Essays in Persuasion), Macmillan, 
London (1972), 321-332 
Keynes, J. M. 1933. The Means to Prosperity; as repr. in The Collected Writings of John 
Maynard Keynes, vol. 9 (Essays in Persuasion), Macmillan, London (1972), 335-366 
Keynes, J. M. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, 
London 
Keynes, J. M. 1937. The General Theory of Employment, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. 51, no. 2, 209-223  
Kregel, J. A. 1985. Budget Deficits, Stabilisation Policy and Liquidity Preference: Keynes’s 
Post-War Policy Proposals, in F. Vicarelli (ed.), Keynes’s Relevance Today, Macmillan, 
London, 28-50 
Kregel, J. A. 1993. Keynesian Stabilisation Policy and Post War Economic Performance, in 
A. Szirmai, B. van Ark and D. Pilat (eds.), Explaining Economic Growth: Essays in Honour 
of Angus Maddison, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 429-445 
 67. 
	  
Kregel, J. A. 1994-95. The viability of economic policy and the priorities of economic 
policy, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol. 17, no. 2, 261-277 
Leijonhufvud, A. 1967. Keynes and the Keynesians: A suggested interpretation, American 
Economic Review, vol. 57, no. 2, 401-410 
Lerner, A. P. 1943. Functional Finance and the Federal Debt, Social Research, vol. 10, no. 
1, 38-51 
Melloan, G. 2009. We’re All Keynesians Again, Wall Street Journal, 13 January, A17 
Meltzer, A. H. 1981. Keynes’s General Theory: A Different Perspective, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 19, no. 1, 34-64 
Melzter, A. H. 1983. Review: Interpreting Keynes, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 21, 
no. 1, 66-78 
Modigliani, F. 1977. The Monetarist Controversy or, Should We Forsake Stabilization 
Policies? American Economic Review, vol. 67, no. 2, 1-19 
Moggridge, D. E. (ed.) 1979. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: The General 
Theory and After, A Supplement (vol. 29), Macmillan, London  
Moggridge, D. E. (ed.) 1980. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Activities 
1940-1946. Shaping the Post-War World: Employment Commodities (vol. 27), Macmillan, 
London 
Musgrave, R. A. 1987. US fiscal policy, Keynes, and Keynesian economics, Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, vol. 10, no. 2, 171-182 
Patinkin, D. 1983a. Multiple Discoveries and the Central Message, American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 89, no. 2, 306-323 
Patinkin, D. 1983b. Review: New Perspectives or Old Pitalls? Some Comments on Allan 
Meltzer’s Interpretation of the General Theory, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 21, no. 
1, 47-51 
Patinkin, D. 1984. Keynes and Economics Today, The American Economic Review, vol. 74, 
no. 2, 97-102 
 68. 
	  
Pearce, K. A. and Hoover, K. D. 1995. After the Revolution: Paul Samuelson and the 
Textbook Keynesian Model, in A. Cottrell and M. Lawlor (eds.), New Perspectives on 
Keynes, History and Political Economy (vol. 27 supplement), 183-216 
Pérez Caldentey, E. 2003. Chicago, Keynes and Fiscal Policy, Investigación Económica, 
vol. 62, no. 246, 15-45 
Pressman, S. 1987. The Policy Relevance of The General Theory, Journal of Economic 
Studies, vol. 14, no. 4, 13-23 
Preston, M. 1988. Aspects of the Theory of Fiscal Policy, in W. Eltis, and P. Sinclair (eds.), 
Keynes and Economic Policy: The Relevance of The General Theory after Fifty Years, 
Macmillan Press, London, 102-123 
Reddy, S. 2009. The New Old Big Thing in Economics: J.M. Keynes, Wall Street Journal, 8 
January, A10 
Scitovsky, T. 1984. Lerner’s Contribution to Economics, Journal of Economic Literature, 
vol. 22, no. 4, 1547-1571 
Seccareccia, M. 1994. Socialization of investment, in P. Arestis and M. Sawyer (eds.), The 
Elgar Companion to Radical Political Economy, Edward Elgar, Hampshire, 375-379 
Seccareccia, M. 1995. Keynesianism and Public Investment: A Left-Keynesian Perspective 
on the Role of Government Expenditures and Debt, Studies in Political Economy, vol. 46, 
43-78 
Skidelsky, R. 2010a. Deficit Disorder: The Keynes Solution, New Statesman, 17 May, 30	  
Skidelsky, R. 2010b. Keynes: The Return of the Master, Penguin Books, London 
Smithin, J. N. 1989. The Composition of Government Expenditures and the Effectiveness of 
Fiscal Policy, in J. Pheby (ed.), New Directions in Post-Keynesian Economics, Edward 
Elgar, Hampshire, 209-227 
Wray, L. R. 1994. Is Keynesian policy dead after all these years? Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, vol. 17, no. 2, 287-306 
 
